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Abstract  –  This  paper  discusses  the  idea  of  levels  of 
autonomy of systems – be this technical  or organic – and 
compares the insights with models employed by industries 
used to describe maturity and capability of their products. 
 1  Introduction
he quantification of system autonomy is 
deemed  desirable  as  measure  of 
performance  of  products.  The  term 
autonomous proposes  to  customers  the  idea 
that  they will  spend less time and effort  on 
monitoring  a  system  or  fixing  problems 
observed  during  its  operation.  Additional 
benefits  of  autonomy  are  considered  the 
ability to  keep a system operational  even if 
communication  channels  between  operator 
and device fail. 
T
However, I observe a new trend to redeclare 
projects  formerly  titled  as  autonomous  as 
automatic again. It is also observed by others 
that efforts made towards definition of “levels 
of autonomy” do not contribute effectively to 
solutions  and  are  hence  discouraged  for 
practical  engineering  parties.  For  example, 
the  U.  S.  Department  of  Defense  warns  to 
invest  effort  into  autonomy models  because 
they  do  not  contribute  to  improved  armed 
forces  performance  [1].  Instead,  the  DoD 
concludes that creating optimized systems for 
selected  scenarios  has  proven  cheaper  and 
more  satisfactory  and  that  this  more 
traditional  approach  does  not  preclude 
creation of systems with resilient features or 
some temporary degree of self-governance.  
This  paper  will  delve  into  the  question 
whether  calling  systems  “autonomous”  is 
useful  anymore.  Furthermore  I  explore  the 
possibility that industry has tried to define the 
levels along the wrong lines of thought. 
Down this paper I will propose a different 
model of systems autonomy that is suited to 
explain  the  drift  away  from  attributing 
technical products as autonomous and to call 
them automatic again. I will also discuss the 
concept that industry will never be motivated 
to  produce  autonomous  systems  but  only 
highly automatized products. 
 2  Concept of Autonomy
Most of scientific literature attempts to de-
fine autonomy in context of particular appli-
cations. For example, Beer [2] made a survey 
of autonomy definitions for the area of robot 
human interactions.  Other  domains,  such as 
mathematics, ethics, education or economics 
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define their own concepts of autonomy. Be-
cause the definitions are expressed in domain-
specific terms, those definitions are not to be 
considered systemic,  i.e.  they cannot  be ap-
plied  to  arbitrary  systems,  contexts  or  do-
mains.
Beer's collection of definitions is most rele-
vant  for engineers as it  deals with technical 
products. According to his findings most au-
thors cited by Beers describe autonomy as the 
capability to
• not require permanent control
• refine goals
• deal with changing environments
• perform cognitive tasks
• act rationally 
(regarding defined goals)
Such functions are often organized in “lev-
els of autonomy”. Beers relates to the ALFUS 
framework [3] as an example for this. Today, 
defining “general levels” of autonomy is per-
ceived  as  inadequate  as  this  would  imply 
some  general  level  of  autonomy  across  the 
many functional aspects of technical systems. 
However,  current  (robotic)  appliances  often 
demonstrate  autonomy  in  particular  areas 
only, as for example an ability to fix a physi-
cal impasse, correct sensor noise, update route 
or to simplify human surveillance and moni-
toring activities by selective data presentation. 
Such systems can prove extremely flexible at 
higher  levels  of  abstraction of  activities  but 
could prove quite helpless at dealing with ba-
sic behavioral challenges and vice versa. 
Beer's  competing  model  organized  around 
the sence-plan-act cycle tries to explain vari-
ous degrees (in-)abilities of robotic appliances 
and his work is just an example of a series of 
attempts to abandon simplistic “levels of au-
tonomy” models for the robotic domain and 
other  technical  areas,  such as  pure  software 
agents. 
Other researchers do not try to explain au-
tonomy in  terms  of  appliance's  capabilities. 
Ziemke [4] surveyed and discussed autonomy 
concepts  from biology, among them concepts 
of  autopoesis  (Varela,  Maturana),  recursive 
self-maintenance (Bickhard), relatively recent 
work  of   Christensen  and  Hooker  or  older 
work of Uexküll. 
I brace out deeper treatment of those ideas 
here but it is important to highlight the con-
clusions drawn by Ziemke in that autonomy, 
as is observed in organic systems, is different 
from  “artificial  autonomy”  that  engineers 
strive  for.  One  could  differentiate  between 
“natural  autonomy”  and  “artificial  auton-
omy”. Figure 1 shows a basic concept of this 
idea.
Despite that authors researching properties 
of  “natural  autonomy” occasionally mention 
or  imply  “higher  levels”  of  autonomy  - 
among them one could be responsible for cre-
ation  of  conscious  experience  -  I  am  not 
aware of any “standard” model to characterize 
the amount of autonomy of a system from this 
line of research and will hence give a try in 
this paper. 
Figure  1:  natural  and artificial  autonomy strive  
for different goals
In general, I will follow the systemic auton-
omy concepts  of  Bickhard,  Christensen  and 
Hooker who explain autonomy of a system as 
the ability to maintain its  structure in a dy-
namically changing environment. This struc-
ture  needs not  be  necessarily  closed  – con-
trary to autopoietic ideas presented by Varela 
and Maturana earlier on but it should be intu-
itively clear that enforcement of structure is 
technically  easier  in  setups  with  guarded 
boundaries. Bourgine and Stewart treated the 
question of self-maintenance and autopoiesis 
in closed and open systems in more detail [5]. 
Their  extended  definition  of  autopoietic 
properties relies on the idea of a process re-
print over time. Ideally, such autonomous sets 
of processes show immune to attempts to con-
trol their function via external variables. If it 
was possible to define different degrees of in-
fluence on such autonomous sets then it could 
be possible to define a relatively robust sys-
temic model of levels of (natural) autonomy 
in terms of how well the system can immu-
nize itself against a certain type of attempt to 
alter its internal function. 
It is very interesting to apply this concept of 
autonomy to dead things such as a rock. In-
deed, a rock will preserve its structure quite a 
bit of time and will  withstand quite a bit  of 
external influence. At first it appears alienat-
ing to call a piece of rock “autonomous” but 
at a second glance it could be quite convinc-
ing:  The  rock  consists  of  billions  of  atoms 
communicating  with  each  other  by  electro-
mechanical forces maintaining and correcting 
the structure of the rock in all conditions. It is 
the characteristic of a systemic theory of au-
tonomy that it is applicable to all systems but 
it also means that not all autonomous systems 
are necessarily all that exciting to analyze or 
that they are equipped with sophisticated cog-
nitive capabilities. 
However, question of  achieving autonomy 
is posed mostly in context of life-like things. 
Barandiaran  and  Moreno  clustered  various 
types  of  processes  in  life-like  systems  in  a 
(mostly)  nested  manner  in  order  to  explain 
self-maintenance  in  changing  environments 
[6]. This would be the closest to a “levels of 
autonomy model” that I am aware of but since 
it emphasizes the idea of “nested control” and 
because it covers internal and external aspects 
of maintenance, it is difficult to show how a 
life-like  system  could  not  have  any  of  the 
process types. In contrast, the idea of levels is 
that elevated levels are optional. 
None of the authors seems to treat  auton-
omy from a reproductive point of view. Ter-
minology  like  self-maintenance and  auton-
omy suggest properties of instantiated singu-
lar  objects  but  the  idea  can  be  extended to 
classes of objects as well, opening the oppor-
tunity  to  think  about  (self-)maintenance  of 
systems and structure not only over time but 
also over space. In that extended view a sys-
tem (class) can gain autonomy by reprinting 
unaffected instances if it cannot self-maintain 
anymore. One could call this as some kind of 
“teleporting” self-maintenance but  reproduc-
tion is  the more common term. Example of 
this type of autonomous entity could be the 
computer  virus  spawning  multiple  instances 
of  itself.  It  would  prove  very  hard  to  kill. 
Even if individual instances were eradicated, 
it  could  still  manage  to  follow  a  specific 
agenda (such as encrypting disk files). In bi-
ology the analogy would be a species of or-
ganisms which would become autonomous by 
implementing reproductive features. 
An  extreme  view  of  autonomous  systems 
would fully concentrate on reproduction and 
would take a space-time approach.  It  would 
simplify to  explain  how systems can elasti-
cally and dynamically adapt their forth-exis-
tence strategy between reprinting in the same 
place (reproduction over time) or reprinting in 
a different place (reproduction over space). A 
hypothetical  autonomous  system  (e.g.  some 
kind  of  organism),  can  follow a strategy to 
evade influence (control amount of inference 
from external variables), to harden its protec-
tions (lower sensitivity to external variables), 
increase  its  healing  capabilities  (faster  re-
placement  of  compromised  blocks  which 
were  impacted  by  external  variables  using 
newly  replicated  blocks)  or  replicate  alto-
gether  its  state  into  a  different  place  where 
certain variables (e.g. predator's states) do not 
affect it. 
Moreover, autonomy can be temporary and 
contextual.  I  call  this  relativistic  autonomy. 
For example, a system could have an unlock-
ing mechanism that would allow insertion of 
dependencies to “external” variables. After in-
sertion, such variable or system of variables 
could be considered as “part of” the target au-
tonomous system. Autonomous systems with 
self-discovery capabilities will  indeed detect 
the insertion and reorganize its boundaries (if 
they  exist)  in  order  to  protect  the  attached 
variable or system of variables. 
Such mechanisms require a long access key 
(in terms of bit of information or units of en-
ergy) by the environment in order not to inter-
fere with regular operation of an autonomous 
system. This is expressed as a resistor in fig-
ure 2. If defended off systems can access vari-
ables  or  systems of  variables  against  which 
the autonomous system shows little  defense 
then the system can either fall under control 
of a foreign system or, if it is learning by ex-
perience,  has  to  increase  autonomy  against 
such  channels.  Sophisticated  systems  will 
therefore manage their “trust” and “security” 
actively, in order to retain autonomy in other 
areas. 
Relativistic  autonomy  introduces  the  con-
cept that property of autonomy can be the re-
sult of an angle at which the environment is 
interacting with a system. This again brings 
up security topics when designing products.
 3  Levels of System 
Autonomy
It  is quite natural to assume that  attaining 
higher levels of autonomy for a system (set of 
autonomous  processes)  would  require  im-
proved capabilities of behavior control (cog-
nitive capabilities). However, this could be a 
falsehood. Let us imagine a scenario in which 
a huge armored animal with very basic cogni-
tive capabilities is pursuing its business when 
becoming target of a group of very intelligent, 
smaller and weaker creatures. It is not diffi-
cult to imagine that the heavily armored ani-
mal  can  retaliate,  repel  an  intelligently  or-
chestrated attack and defeat the attackers. In 
that  case  it  would prove unaffected by sys-
tems of higher mental capabilities. However, 
it could become victim of a cognitively less 
sophisticated predator with bigger mass and 
force.  In  that  case  the  autonomous  system 
would fall under external control (and the ani-
mal would be eaten). 
Defining critical points on which a system 
would fall short of autonomy or lose it, is in-
teresting for defining levels of (systemic) au-
tonomy.  Because  cognitive  capabilities 
clearly  compensate  for  strength,  speed,  en-
ergy and vice versa, it is not possible to define 
levels of systems autonomy in pure cognitive 
terms such as “can reason ahead of time” or 
“can  detect  invariants  in  sensory  stimuli”. 
Nevertheless, as we will see, coping with very 
aggressive scenarios requires types of internal 
system capabilities that are familiar with what 
we know of cognitive agents.  Moreover, the 
next  proposed  model  does  not  suggest  that 
systems in higher levels of autonomy can au-
tomatically  take  control  of  systems  with 
lower levels of autonomy. For example, a hu-
man could move a rock but  not crush it.  In 
this sense a higher level autonomy system is 
not  necessarily  capable  to  compromise  a 
lower  autonomy  level  system.  However,  a 
crushed rock will never return to its original 
structure while a broken leg will heal. Levels 
of  autonomy are  useful  to  give  a  prognosis 
how a system will  behave after being struc-
turally violated. 
In order to attain a systemic levels descrip-
tion I will try to define them in terms of sys-
tems and how their reproduction policies have 
to improve. I will introduce a new level to the 
model each time whenever environmental ag-
gressiveness raises to a point where qualita-
tive  enhancements  of  the  system policy  are 
mandatory.  Since  autonomy  is  about  struc-
ture,  violation  of  this  structure  and  later 
restoration of it, a key concept to understand-
ing the various levels of autonomy is coming 
through configuration theory. Such configura-
tion theory is organized of plants (resources 
to be configured), retreat storages (memory of 
configurations), re-configuration mechanisms 
and the information transfer speeds between 
plants,  retreat  storages  and  re-configuration 
facilities. An important concept in configura-
tion theory is the cost of re-configuration that 
Figure  2:  Relativistic  autonomy  is  a  concept  
similar  to  saying  “is  independent  of”  other  
influencing  systems and their  variables  but  it  is  
not equivocal with it.
is a key modulator to expression of system's 
other affordances. As a  consequence we will 
see more and more cognitive features slip into 
the level descriptions but since the definitions 
are  systemic,  the  levels  do  not  unavoidably 
demand the equivalent of a cognitive appara-
tus in the system. For example, a sponge will 
react adaptively to external forces  and return 
to its original state without anything compara-
ble  to  a  dedicated  nervous  system.  Despite 
lacking  units  of  behavior  control,  a  sponge 
will “remember” its original form and will be 
able to “restore” it at a finite speed. That's the 
“systemic”  property  of  the  approach.  How-
ever, if read carefully, the following level def-
initions should translate relatively easily into 
known capabilities of central nervous systems 
or cognitive control units. 
The  following level  descriptions  represent 
each level as is shown in figure 4.
 3.1  Level 0 – Not autonomous
Level 0: At this level a system is not auton-
omous.  It  is  characterized  by  permanent 
process of structure deterioration.  Deteriora-
tion is  caused by the faintest  external  influ-
ences. A collection of stones forming a circle 
on a table is an example of a system that is 
not autonomous. Small vibrations or a push of 
the wind will destroy the formation. The ex-
ample system has no policy of maintenance, 
does not consume energy or information for 
this purpose and has no means to remember 
its original configuration. However, the clas-
sification as level 0 may depend on the exact 
system  boundaries.  For  example,  a  vacuum 
cleaner may not be autonomous (level 0) but 
if you draw the system boundary around hu-
man users and vacuum cleaners then we de-
tect a symbiotic relationship among those sys-
tems that warrants autonomy to its non-auton-
omous parts (Figure 3). In the suggested sce-
nario vacuum cleaners can defy deterioration 
and attacks on it by exposing certain type of 
utility  to  users  and  by  being  reprinted  by 
them. The wide success and presence of vac-
uum  cleaners  in  every  household  should 
clearly explain how the system guarantees its 
existence  by  reprinting  itself  over  time  and 
over space. This would elevate the scenario to 
level 1 autonomy. 
Figure 4: Proposed levels of systemic autonomy
 
Figure 3: The vacuum cleaner species appears autonomous
 3.2  Level 1 – Reproductive 
Autonomy
Level  1:  At  that  level  the  environment  is 
following static rules of behavior which must 
be immunized against. A static environment is 
not without motion or flow but the dynamics 
are  characterized  by  relatively  stable  higher 
derivatives close to zero. In such an environ-
ment a static policy can be sufficient in order 
to maintain system's  conditions of existence. 
Similarly  to  the  static  environment,  a  static 
policy  is  not  necessarily  without  behavior. 
Generation of a pulse-width signal  to repre-
sent 75% or power (cf. figure 5) is clearly in-
volving changes of state but is nonetheless a 
static behavior policy and hence static. Such 
policies need not necessarily be simple: Finite 
automatons  for  controlling  system  behavior 
with billions of states and transitions  are still 
static in the here necessary sense. 
A more concrete example of a level 1 auton-
omous system would be a  fish that  is  opti-
mized  for  a  certain  water  depth  and  water 
speeds  (cf.  figure  6).  It  is  irrelevant  that 
swimming is a complex process: As long as it 
reproduces in a certain area and implements a 
certain depth holding mechanisms and main-
tains a constant swimming speed, it will sur-
vive in the stream of water and, in fact, could 
be quite successful  in doing so.  Please note 
that in the case of the imaginary fish the sys-
temic policy consists of moving muscles with 
a certain force and speed. The success of this 
policy lies in the equilibrium of the forces of 
water  and  forces  of  propulsion  and a  mini-
mum satisfaction of energy supply from the 
food. This success does not mainly rely on so-
phisticated  behavioral  features  but  on  ener-
getic and mechanical properties of the system. 
If the system's policy told to develop weaker 
muscles then the fish could not survive in the 
optimal water depth. 
However, if the flow of water changes – for 
example by changing the layering of flows – 
then this fish species is highly endangered be-
cause the ability to adapt to such changes is a 
feature of level 2 autonomy. 
Figure  6:An  imaginary  fish  swims  at  a  certain  
speed and depth, eats and breeds there. In a static  
environment this is good enough.
I would like to side-remark that creation of 
life (autonomous compounds of matter) will 
probably necessarily go through this level of 
autonomy first. One can shorten it down to “it 
exists because it works” and requires gener-
ous environments – some kind of primordial 
soup of benign conditions. As a consequence, 
autopoietic  systems  developing  further  into 
less benign environments will concentrate on 
protecting  its  core  conditions  by  creating 
adapter mantles and protective boundaries (cf. 
figure 7).
Unless a system is some kind of rock, it will 
suffer from deterioration and will require an 
active part on its own in order to restore its 
structure. This will translate a basic “it exists 
because it works” into numerous drivers nec-
essary to control the more complex protective 
adapter  mantles.  Ziemke  relates  to  work  of 
Damasio in [4] and draws a picture in order to 
explain this relation as is shown in figure  8. 
However, he  leaves  it  open what  the  layers 
mean and where they could come from. I pro-
Figure 5: A static strategy to reprint the system  
over time despite machine deterioration.  This  is  
an example for autonomy of level 1.
pose  to  align  them  with  autonomy  level 
adapter mantles. 
Since such adapters can be functionally lay-
ered in their own right, the amount of possible 
drives  to  control  all  the  functions  is  indeed 
potentially infinite. Functional layers are very 
often used as a model of hierarchical control 
in the environment.  Especially systems with 
learning  capabilities  will  generously  expand 
such functional layer architectures. Therefore, 
it is very difficult to predict the exact expres-
sion of drivers in systems which are allowed 
to grow into a certain niche. This is also an 
everyday experience that people living in dif-
ferent  sub-societies  also  feel  different  about 
great  many  things  and  constantly  look  for 
new concepts to identify and grasp the differ-
ences.  
 3.3  Level 2 – Resilient Autonomy 
Level 2: In level two autonomy is protected 
by allowing the system to adapt to occasional 
changes  in  the  environment  by  overwriting 
the static policy with a new equivalent static 
policy.  For  example,  if  the  energy  source 
weakens in figure 5 then system can crank up 
the  power  rate  of  regulator.  In  contrast  to 
level 1 policies, level 2 are unbounded. If we 
bounded  them then  we  could  convert  them 
into level 1 policies for practical reasons but 
it is important to understand the loss of flexi-
bility.  The  most  generic  and  unbounded 
means to alter policies is to combine random 
modifications of the policy with adaptive res-
onance. 
Level 2 adaptation features are lossy: Once 
a system adapted to a new situation it has lost 
the  old  ability. Think of  a  closed-loop con-
troller in cybernetics. It can be designed with 
an  outside  adapter  to  compensate  for  slow 
wear  out  of  system.  However,  if  system  is 
maintained and wear is removed then it has to 
slowly adapt back into its original parameters. 
In real life the controller would be simply re-
set to original values but in autonomous sys-
tems such resets are limited from the outside. 
A system would have to learn to reset itself in 
order to prevent wasteful adaptations.
Environments, in which processes can take 
place faster than the system can adapt to, can 
exploit this fact in order to gain control over 
the  autonomous  system.  Therefore,  autono-
mous systems in level  2  would be best  ad-
vised to become constantly faster. However, 
that is a feature of level 3.
In  figure  8 the  bottom layer  of  drivers  is 
corresponding  to  level  2  autonomy  in  my 
model. 
 3.4  Level 3 – Assertive Autonomy
Level 3: In that level of autonomy a system 
can protect itself against environments grow-
ing faster in speed. 
Faster, in terms of configuration theory, will 
require a minimized role of adaptation and in-
creased use of configuration templates to the 
task. This will indeed require the retreat stor-
age (memory) for the first time and will de-
Figure  7:  Radical  approaches to protection of  
core autonomy result in creation of  sophisticated  
“environment adapters”.
Figure  8:  Ziemke  draws  a  causation  tree  of  
emotions down to a common root originating in  
basic  organism  functions  such  as  metabolic  
regulation.
mand  triggers  to  start  a  re-configuration 
process.  Ideally,  the  system  can  organize 
stored configurations and implementation fa-
cilities  that  it  develops  by  the  amount  of 
shared information in order to minimize inter-
nal bandwidth requirements which are limit-
ing the maximum re-configuration speed.  
If system is experiencing new states it can 
try  to  remember  them  either  as  discrete 
chunks  or  probability  distributions.  Triggers 
in  level  3  mantle  adapters  must  somehow 
translate into violations of more fundamental 
conditions. This gives raise to regulatory sig-
nals which trigger a sudden reconfiguration of 
policy.  For  example,  people  suddenly  stop 
working  and  go  to   kitchen  to  fetch  some 
food.  This  sudden changes  of  operation  are 
key improvements to overall efficiency of the 
system. The system can execute highly effi-
cient programs sequentially and minimize ef-
fects of the no-free-lunch theorem stating that 
no (static) policy will ever be good in better 
than a fraction of possible cases. 
Important  concept  of  level  3  autonomy is 
that  of  growing complexity. Because  of  the 
technical  demand to switch faster  there is  a 
constant growth of internal dimensionality of 
the  system  (“grows  in  experience”).  Over 
time, it adds policy implementations and trig-
gers to switch them. 
In figure 8 the layer of pains and pleasures 
is corresponding to level 3 autonomy in my 
model.  Various  kinds  of  pain  and  pleasures 
are important triggers to switch major groups 
of policies. 
 3.5  Level 4 – Proactive Autonomy
In level 4 the autonomous system will try to 
synchronize  with  future  events  for  which 
there  is  no  precursor  or  which  suffer  from 
computational  irreducibility  [7].  Environ-
ments  which  are  free  to  act  unpredictably 
(e.g.  environment  is  tactically  constructive) 
can  take  advantage  of  this  in  order  to  gain 
control over the autonomous system. The sys-
tem  must  develop  policies  and  triggers  for 
them before they actually occur. This will re-
quire several  basic things:  The system must 
not  only implement policies to interact with 
the environment but also must model the en-
vironment itself one way or the other. It can 
exploit these models in order to train a new 
policy without the associated risks. For exam-
ple, if a person sees a door with a knob on the 
inside  then  it  can  quickly  imagine  how  it 
would enter the room, get locked and not be 
able  to  get  out  again.  This  would  alter  its 
strategy to use the room and could be inter-
preted as logical reasoning. Readers interested 
in  ideas  of  system synchronization and rea-
soning  through  simulation  can  refer  to  sur-
vey-type  articles  made  by  Pezzulo  [8] and 
Grush [9].
In  order  to  perform  such  synchronization 
with the future – as Pezzulo puts it – systems 
will have to reserve and dedicate parts of its 
own plant to simulating the virtual twin of the 
environment. In fact the simulations must in-
clude some kind of models related to the sys-
tem in order to be useful. Creation of a self-
model appears necessary to do this success-
fully or the simulation would directly interact 
with the real plant in a disturbing way. 
Since simulating all aspects of the environ-
ment  appears  technically  infeasible  even  in 
theoretical  terms,  the  autonomous  system 
must apply trigger/selection and re-configura-
tion capabilities obtained in previous develop-
ment stage in order to set up a proper simula-
tion environment. 
One  of  the  most  important  problems  for 
systems  is  to  compensate  for  reaction  time 
(dead time) in the environment. Many activi-
ties  must  start  long  time  before  any  useful 
feedback  or  trigger  can  fire.  In  order  to 
achieve this, modeling of the environment us-
ing  clocks  is  critical.  A typical  example  of 
synchronization is the use of calendars in or-
der  to  optimize  farming  activities.  Farmers 
have to  work for  months  before  seeing any 
crop to harvest. 
Since simulations can follow various lines 
of development, a system must be able to se-
lect one of the choices and schedule it for ex-
ecution.  Readers  interested  in  how  systems 
could model and exploit such models for de-
cision  making are  referred  to  work  of  Paul 
Werbos [10][11]. 
In  figure  8 the  layer  of  motives  is  corre-
sponding to level 4 autonomy in my model. 
Motives  get  created  &  disappear  along  the 
course of temporal planning and are strongly 
associated  with  mental  simulations  which 
they should guide. 
 3.6  Level 5 – Tactical Autonomy
Life is full of choices. What is to be said by 
this is that an autonomous system will face an 
environment  where  it  cannot  prevent  losses 
and hence must  decide between critical  and 
expendable  resources.  This  is  even  more 
pressing as the environment is full of equiva-
lent objects but the allocation of losses among 
them is not irrelevant for the system making 
the decision.
If a system cannot detect and properly han-
dle meta-patterns of its models then it can be 
overwhelmed  by  an  environment  creating 
functionally  equivalent  permutations.  This 
sounds  very  much  like  autism.  Possibly, 
autism is a consequence of defects when chil-
dren  develop  features  of  level  5  autonomy 
protecting  adapter  mantles.  It  is  speculated 
that vaccination with mercury and aluminum, 
which are very toxic to nerves, is causing this 
modern day mass phenomenon. In any case, if 
a system development failure leads to the in-
ability  to  detect  invariants,  intentional  cre-
ation of permutations would disturb all  trig-
gers,  models  and simulations  of  the  level  4 
agent and hence would allow external systems 
to fool it under own control.  
Since the environment is  full  of  repeating 
patterns and variations of it, it is critical for a 
system to expand models to manage them in a 
taxonomic way. This will also allow to reuse 
functionality  across  various  new  situations. 
Once this is  done,  same concepts will  pave 
any  modeled  scenario  and  the  agent  must 
have means to specialize (de-generalize) his 
scenarios in a way that would satisfy lower-
level  drivers:  For example a fighter  and his 
adversary are both humans but in a fight situ-
ation a fighter  cannot  optimize the situation 
for both. Only one instance is eligible for mo-
tive satisfaction. However, through the gener-
alization of concepts the “fighting function” 
has become independent  of many properties 
of the adversary. 
It  is  clear  that  gaining  on  capabilities  in 
level 5 a system can not only avoid traps or 
synchronize with future events but also avoid 
simulations by accessing equivalent “wrapped 
up  simulations”  in  form  of  conceptualized 
short stories which can be reapplied to each 
object  individually and arrive at  stable con-
clusions  irrespectively  of  many  seemingly 
never repeating situations. 
So, the main new technical feature for level 
5 agents are to reuse chunked model compo-
nents multiple times, to organize them hierar-
chically and to skew treatment of entities of 
same class depending on the side of bound-
aries they are  on (inside/outside).  These are 
indeed fundamental features for making game 
theoretic considerations. That is why I chose 
to call this level of autonomy tactical. Again, 
even if this begs for some cognitive nervous 
system feature,  this  is  not  necessarily so.  A 
group of military generals can use a pool of 
toys moved on a table in order to simulate and 
verify certain strategies, some of them at vari-
ous levels of abstractions. If they are success-
ful in this endeavor then they can contribute 
to the autonomy of the protected state. In fact, 
historically, game theory is output of military 
analysis activities. 
Admittedly, the main obstacle to achieving 
this  kind of  generic  knowledge  base  lies  in 
making all  models  interoperable  and to  my 
knowledge it is not fully resolved. It is out of 
scope  of  this  paper  to  treat  integratability, 
composability or universal knowledge repre-
sentation  approaches  but  mastering  them  is 
key challenge to fully harness level 5 auton-
omy.  
In figure  8 the layer of emotions is corre-
sponding to level 5 autonomy in my model. 
Emotions  towards  concrete  entities  help  to 
amplify  non-universal,  self-centered  policies 
which are necessary in order to stabilize own 
structure in face of many similar, ephemerally 
changing structures  surrounding the  autono-
mous system. 
 3.7  Level 6 – Full Autonomy
How can the level of difficulty can be raised 
even higher?  Well,  even if  systems can ex-
ploit their resources better by improving their 
internal  organization,  they  still  can  suffer 
from significant  dependencies  that  can  only 
be alleviated with greater size of the autono-
mous system.  Level  6  will  require  effective 
communication with external systems in order 
to distribute risks and effects of  major vari-
ables. A species capable of level 6 autonomy 
is equipped with features simplifying creation 
of larger level 1 entities of which they are part 
and which participate from the strength of the 
clusters.  This  extends  the  effective  control 
over  influencing  factors  beyond  immediate 
reach. This is a democratic view. Striving for 
full autonomy is often much less egalitarian. 
In monarchic structures only a single unit of a 
group could claim full autonomy at the cost 
of reducing autonomy of all other units. Such 
reductions are only acceptable by the units if 
their cost-benefit calculus is on the positive; 
meaning that  gaining higher  level  of  auton-
omy in that context would (re-)introduce hard 
to control risks. 
The process of organizing groups of level 6 
units  is  recursive.  New groups  become cre-
ated spontaneously on the “it exists because it 
works” basis and through a series of more or 
less painful  events the unit  is  upgraded and 
mantled according to the schema in figure  7. 
Figure 9 shows this recursive process. 
Figure  9:  Autonomous  systems  form  larger  
autonomous systems  which  will  mature until  all  
resources are exhausted.
 4  Conclusions for 
System Designers
The industry's use of the term “autonomy” 
is  slowly replaced by the term “automatic”. 
For  example,  the  SAE  J3016  standard  is 
defining  six  automation  levels  for  what  we 
call  “autonomous  vehicles”  today. 
Automation  is  correctly  replacing  the  term 
“autonomy”  step  by  step  in  the  industry 
because  technical  products  shall  not  be 
autonomous.  Industries  are  not  interested in 
creation of products which can escape control 
of human operators. 
However,  perception  of  autonomy  can 
depend  on  perspective:  A highly  automated 
weapons  system  is  perceived  as 
“autonomous” by the opponent (who cannot 
impose  control  over  the  system)  but  is 
perceived  as  “automatic”  by  the  weapons 
operator. Such perspectives are the result  of 
relativistic autonomy which I have explained.
For  practical  purposes,  the  question  of  
a/a-perspective  is  better  treated  under  the 
question of secure control and the questions 
of  potential  loss  of  control  from  poorly 
implemented security  mechanisms.  A highly 
automated system could become autonomous 
in  situations  where  authorized  control 
facilities stop working (operator gets “locked 
out”)  or  it  could  implicate  such  state  when 
indeed  the  system  has  been  brought  under 
foreign  control.  In  all  cases  this  would  be 
considered undesirable. 
What is undesired for products is desired in 
self-maintaining systems. In this paper I have 
proposed  a  six  level  model  of   “natural” 
autonomy that is organized by the amount of 
aggressiveness  of  a  system's  environment. 
The  riskier,  the  more  manipulative  and 
deceptive the environment is,  the higher are 
the  requirements  toward  the  autonomous 
system  in  order  not  to  fall  under  foreign 
control  (and  risk  disintegration).  This  is  at 
odds with industrial autonomy models where 
the relationship between operator and product 
is  defined  and  not  challenged.  Operator 
should not lose control of the system but have 
less effort to impose his will on it – so to say. 
Some  researchers  call  this  “artificial 
autonomy”. Even the most automatic products 
on  the  market  like  the  Google  car  are  not 
reaching levels of autonomy beyond level 2. 
There  seems  to  exist  no  good  reason  why 
Google  car  should  ever  be  equipped  with 
mechanisms  for  increasing  its  internal 
complexity in order to make it level 3 unit. 
However,  systems  with  low  or  absent 
autonomy  can  participate  in  higher  level 
autonomy systems by  being  embedded in  a 
new systemic context. This will give external 
observers  the  impression  that  these  systems 
attained higher level  autonomy. This can be 
an  important  instrument  to  create  pseudo-
autonomous products if  true autonomy shall 
be  avoided.  Pseudo-autonomy  is  best 
explained  with  externalized  reproduction 
mechanisms.  I  have  briefly  discussed  this 
matter on the vacuum cleaner example. 
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